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Wartime PSYOP Applications · Oct 24, 11:04 AM

Christina Jackman
Nephi Self
Joe Greathouse

WARTIME PSYOP APPLICATIONS

I. Introduction

Psychological operations, also called PSYOP, constitute a type of weapons system used to aid the mission objectives set by a commander. Former US President Dwight Eisenhower, in a memo to his then-secretary of State John Foster Dulles, described PSYOP as anything “from the singing of a beautiful national anthem to the most extraordinary kind of physical sabotage.” Nelson Rockefeller, an American communications tycoon, served as Eisenhower’s principal advisor and strategist for psychological operations during between 1954 and ‘55.

The primary purpose of any PSYOP is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning or behavior of an audience. Psychological operations should not be confused with psychological impact. Use of force produces psychological side effects, but does not primarily target the emotions and behavior of the audience. PSYOPS are used both against friendly or hostile military or civilian audiences. Often the target audience of a PSYOP consists of both civilian and military persons.

The most effective form of PSYOP involves use of broadcasting: television, video, clandestine radio, in conjunction with printed leaflets, or any printed advertisement. A growing international trend in which US military is called upon by other nations for peacekeeping operations has increased demand for effective PSYOP. The objective of this report is to identify the most effective wartime PSYOP applications in the interest of US world relations.

Violent conflict in which US forces engage enemy forces are observed and criticized by the global media. Strict rules of engagement severely limit the offensive force of US troops on foreign soil. Using effective operational and strategic PSYOP, the United States can achieve victory in battle while limiting the both the overall use of force, collateral damage inflicted, and friendly casualties sustained during conflict.

II. History of PSYOP

Genghis Kahn used PSYOP in Asia as early as 1250 AD. Using soldiers with considerable acting talent in civilian clothing, Kahn sent scare tacticians into enemy encampments prior to his approach. The operatives would warn the enemy of Kahn’s “undefeatable force” that approached, greatly exaggerating the size and experience of his soldiers. An old Chinese tale hints of soldiers tying reed pipes to the end of kites which were then flown over enemy camps at night. The whistling sound created in the darkness was said to have severely unnerved the superstitious enemy.

Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” describes the overall objective of war as “defeating the enemy without ever having to fight.” PSYOP is a proven successful means to fulfilling that objective. During the 1989 US takeover of Panama, ousted leader Manuel Noriega holed himself inside a building after being surrounded by US forces. PSYOP units quickly deployed a field of loudspeakers around the building. American heavy metal music blared through the loudspeakers for 72 hours until the sleep deprived Noriega finally gave himself up peacefully. These are examples of Operational PSYOP.

Both classical Asian and contemporary US tactical warfare places emphasis on Operational PSYOP to promote the effectiveness of the area commander’s campaign strategies. Operational PSYOP can take place before, during and after hostilities in a specific geographic area. The target in these previous examples are typically military personel, but often are used against civilian populations to avoid hostilities.

Confusion and demoralization are critical weapons for psychological operations. A collection of Chinese proverbs known as “Thrity Six Strategems War” attributes peaceful takeover to “appearing to be strong when one is weak, or by appearing to be weak when one is strong.” Marine PSYOP unit leader Dan Voss has taken part in several successful operational PSYOP during the current conflict in Iraq. His unit is equipped with vehicles specially designed to confuse the enemy using loudspeaker systems like those used in Panama. “When we see an Iraqi position” says Voss “we can make it appear that there is an extremely large US force nearby”. Enemies can be coerced into retreat or surrender by being exposed to the artificial sound of approaching tanks, helicopters or charging troops.

III. Modern PSYOP

Modern PSYOP applications are owed in part to German propagandist Joseph Goebbels, who utilized broadcast media, printed material and cinema to expose german civilians and military to Nazi anti-semitism during WWII. Under the rule of Adolf Hitler, propaganda played an integral part in generating public support. Government controlled newspaper, public posters and billboards validated radical information heard on clandestine radio, a type of broadcasting in which the involvement of political entities is hidden from the target audience.

The first movement of institutionalized military propaganda and intelligence in the United States was recorded in 1952. That year the National Science Foundation (NSF) reported that over 96% of all federal funding for social science was drawn from the US military.

Over the next twenty years millions of US dollars were spent annually on communications research at civilian institutions such as the Institute for Social Research, the Bureau of Social Science Research, and the RAND Corporation. Major funding towards social science research also came from the Ford, Rockefeller and Russell Sage Foundations. These institutions operated covertly with the National Security Council (NSC), a government agency officially assigned to “advise the president on political and military strategy” and received no congressional funding, or presidential approval for PSYOPS. According to Christopher Simpson’s “Science of Coercion”, an unofficial branch of the NSC known as the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), coordinated the only policy of conducting covert operations around the world. “By 1952, this unofficial agency employed about six thousand operatives in forty-seven field stations with an estimated annual budget of at least 82 million dollars.” Simpson adds “Virtually every penny was spent on psychological warfare”

^{“The Partnership of Nations is Here to Help”}

IIIa. Leaflets

Leaflets are used for a variety of reasons. Often distributed by airborne “leaflet bombs,” devices packed with the small paper leaflets, these advertisements can demoralize the enemy or boost friendly morale, communicate intentions to civilians or promote clandestine broadcasting stations.

ØM 129 E Leaflet bomb: The M129 leaflet bomb is an Air Force item, obtained through Air Force ordinance channels. It’s empty weight is about 115 lbs and when loaded with leaflets, approximately 225 lbs. It can carry approximately 30,000 13×20 centimeter, 16 lb, machine rolled leaflets. Before the leaflets are placed in the bomb, the detonating cord is placed in the seam between the two halves. When the bomb is released, the fuse functions at the predetermined time, detonating the primer cord separating the two body sections, detaching the fins, and releasing the leaflets.

Writers of leaflets are usually psychological operatives familiar with the language and customs of the audience. Sometimes defectors are used effectively as leaflet writers. An intimate knowledge of the intended audience allows the writer to easily translate the ideas to be incorporated into the leaflet. The most preferable writer has recently spent time in the region and is abreast of local socio-political change, and the environment in which it functions.

Problems With Leaflets

I.Objectivity is the most difficult challenge facing the leaflet writer, who must rely solely on gathered intelligence and avoid expressing personal views in order to write effectively. The leaflet should fit the same emotional process of the audience and pertain to it’s member’s interest. Journalists with previous residence in the area make effective leaflet writers because they are experienced at presenting objective information in a form that is understood most easily by the intended reader.

II.The PSYOP writer has the toughest selling job in the world. The enemy will use every means at its disposal to discredit the leaflet’s contents. A negative attitude is interpreted by the enemy as a sign of weakness. Only positive appeals can wear down the psychological barrier the enemy has erected against the PSYOP writer.

III.During wartime, civilians and military persons are not always allowed to pick up dropped leaflets; therefore, their print has to be large, while the leaflet itself is small enough to be delivered in mass quantities. Since picking up leaflets is sometimes unlawful, audience members will rarely pick up leaflets which are not small enough to be easily picked up and hidden for later examination. This forces the leaflet designer to keep the message brief, but attractive.

IV.Leaflets are typically colored to stand out against a certain terrain, but in some operations are purposely colored to blend in with the terrain to allow potential readers access under restricted conditions.

Photographs and cartoons give the leaflet a lasting impression. All graphics on the leaflet should be captioned; otherwise, the audience may not understand the point the image is being used to illustrate. Cartoons can also illustrate key concepts for illiterates. The visual format of the entire leaflet should be symmetrical and visually pleasing and form should be standardized when appropriate (e.g. surrender passes are standardized throughout the campaign for recognition purposes).

ØGaining interest with leaflets – To gain the interest of the audience within the first few words, the first sentence or two of the text should contain the substance of the message, with the facts and details following. Credible and verifiable facts whether favorable or not, are the backbone of the leaflet message because they demand attention. The target audience often risks death or punishment for reading leaflets; therefore, the information must be of vital importance for the audience to continue reading. Because of space limitations, the text should be simple and to the point, presenting the message to the target audience without confusion. The leaflet normally presents only one theme, since more themes distract the audience from the persuasive strengths of the primary theme. If more than one theme is used, they should be closely related.

Any technical blunder by US officials limits the effectiveness of PSYOP broadcasts and supplies opposition groups with ready-made anti US propaganda. The following incidents have proven harmful to US psychological operations worldwide during the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflict by supplying oppositional operatives with viable intelligence, which is used in written leaflets and radio broadcasting against the US.

1.Failure to find weapons of mass destruction.
2.Failure to capture Al-Qaeda leader and FBI’s most wanted terrorist Osama bin-Laden.
3.Failure to capture Osama bin-Laden’s first in command Al-Zawahiri.
4.Failure to involve United Nations and ally countries with US and British coalition efforts.

The following article is from a leaflet of the Seattle Communist Study Group calling on activists to march against the war on March 19 as well as come to the overall rally. It calls for building up the anti-imperialist section of the movement, and promotes the feeder march from SCCC (Seattle Central Community College) to the main rally at Seattle Center March 15, 2005.

“MARCH against the occupation war in Iraq! Target imperialism!
Two years ago the US government invaded Iraq. It promised a short war and proclaimed that the Iraqi people would welcome the troops as liberators. Both have proven to be lies. After two years, a war of occupation continues. In it the Iraqi people have been subjected to indiscriminate bombing, artillery fire, check-point shootings, collective punishment, torture, and economic devastation. Over 100,000 of them have now died as a result, along with more than 1,500 US troops, and the bloodbath continues.
The US said it was liberating Iraq from tyranny, but it quickly became clear that it only wanted to replace the Saddam Hussein tyranny with its own tyranny. Thus, after the invasion it set up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as an instrument of direct colonial rule, with US troops acting as enforcers. The US did not plan to allow the Iraqi people to determine their own future and elect their own government according to rules they themselves had decided. But the Iraqi masses demanded elections, and resisted the CPA-imposed agenda of privatization and other predatory and oppressive laws from the outset. An armed insurgency also developed, led by the some sections of the Iraqi bourgeoisie, and drawing in many toilers as well. And, since the US had to have an alliance with significant sections of the Iraqi bourgeoisie if it were to shape Iraq in its imperial interests over the long term, and sections of it too were pressing for elections, it finally consented to hold them on January 30, 2005. It also transferred power to a hand-picked “interim government” in order to put an Iraqi face on the occupation until the elections could be held, and to serve as a vehicle for rallying wider sections of the Iraqi bourgeoisie to support them…”
IV. Strategic PSYOP

Al-Qaeda attacks on the US World Trade Center in 2000 illustrated the effectiveness of using mass media to rally public support. Few Americans have since forgotten the images of civilians being killed by the suicide attacks. Supporters of bin-Laden remember the same images for different reasons.

Osama bin-Laden, Iraqi born leader of the Al-Qaeda Arab terrorist threat and mastermind of previous attacks against US sovereignty, was seen by millions of television viewers shortly after the World Trade Center Bombings. Bin-Laden sent recorded video messages to a popular Arab television station via courier from somewhere in Afghanistan (which was determined by closely examining the vegetation in the video). The recording contained a declaration by bin-Laden himself claiming responsibility for the attacks and warning of future attacks against US civilians.

Shortly afterward, President Bush publicly condemned Al-Qaeda, calling their aggression “evil acts” bolstering American and British support for a campaign against known terrorist training camps and weapons production facilities in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Phillipines and North Korea, which he called “the axis of evil.”

Bin Laden’s public declaration, which targeted the emotional vulnerability of US citizens, compromised the public sense of security in the US. Bin-Laden’s demonstration, a basic strategic method of psychological operations, also exposed the weakness of homeland security and caught the intelligence community by surprise. The actual tools required for this PSYOP included only a commercial video recorder, handful of blank videotapes, and proper postage.

Meanwhile, US forces began a Middle Eastern offensive against terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, using the images of the September 11th incident to gain political momentum. President George W. Bush, addressed the American and world media regularly during the campaign, using carefully chosen phraseology describing the WTC bombings and the terrorists involved as “evildoers” and reminding the audience to “never forget September 11th.” These are examples of Strategic PSYOP, which are broad-scale weapons that do not serve any one particular mission objective, rather setting the tone for future campaigns by establishing a perpetual thought process in the audience.

The tragedy of September 11th generated enough political momentum in favor of the Bush administration to instigate a second invasion, this time against Iraq and its ruling Baath Party leader Saddam Hussein. Michael Moore’s liberal documentary film “Farenheit 9/11” attempted to discredit the decisions of the Bush administration during and after the WTC crises and persuade Americans to vote against his re-election in 2004. Interestingly, this documentary contains video footage of nearly every incident leading to Iraq invasion; however, the dramatic footage of the actual WTC bombing was purposely excluded. By excluding the short recording of the hijacked planes colliding with the buildings, Moore created a compelling argument against the controversial decision to commit US troops in an Iraqi invasion. Bush not only proceeded to invade Iraq with the help of Australian and British coalition troops, but was also reelected as US President in 2004.

IVa. Television

Television, including video tape recording, is the most effective medium of propaganda because inexpensive receivers can be distributed to the audience and includes aspects of all other effective communication such as radio and print. Television also adds sight and motion which makes the viewer feel as though they are actually participating in the events unfolding on screen.

Problems with television, video and cinema

1.Since only those with an above average income can afford televisions in most underprivileged countries of the world, the message may only be received by a narrow portion of the population.

2.Televisions also require electricity to operate; therefore, in addition to broadcasting messages to the intended audience, delivery of extra materials such as battery powered receivers is sometimes necessary. Video tapes are effective offshoots of television broadcasting, since their contents are usually simple to duplicate and redistribute.

Films are the most resource demanding form of strategic PSYOP. Should propagandists during wartime lack the time or resources to make motion pictures, appropriate pre-existing films can be selected from available resources, however the audience effect must be carefully considered. Motion pictures of different kinds are used in PSYOP for three main purposes.

ØEntertainment: If the intended theme is interwoven into the plot of a cartoon or movie it can be extremely effective during operations at both serving a commander’s strategy and gaining attention for further PSYOP.

ØDocumentary: An objective presentation of a scene which shows socially or politically sensitive acts are prime targets for military propaganda since it’s viewer perceives it to be original and unbiased.

ØTraining films: A number of US Government produced films are available for use by the military psychological operator. They must, however, be selected with care since some of these contain unproductive, biased information.

Most children and a large proportion of adults will presume film information as factual without question. Motion pictures can also be easily presented, easily distributed and are readily received by most audiences. Cartoons can be particularly effective because of this reception.

Duck and Cover was a short educational film produced in 1951 by the United States Federal Government’s Civil Defense branch shortly after the Soviet Union began nuclear testing.

V.Conclusion

Modern PSYOP applications involving broadcasting compete daily with commercially ran corporations who are exceptionally familiar with the target audience. These corporations work hard at discrediting the enemy message and operate with limited funding and technology. In order for US wartime PSYOP to compete with members of the commercial media, who typically direct all efforts to expose and undermine the efforts of the previously described operations, the credibility of the delivered message must be flawless. Therefore the effectiveness of PSYOP applications in the Middle East can be greatly increased by boosting the Busch administration’s receptivity among the world media.

Public support remains the most sensitive aspect of modern wartime PSYOP. The world’s instant accessibility to news information prevents any effort to localize any campaign. Leaflets dropped by the US are de-classified as soon as they are airborne, since printed material in Iraq can easily and most likely will be seen on the nightly news anywhere in the world. The loss of life during conflict has become extremely sensitive during the recent Middle Eastern campaigns; therefore, operational and strategic PSYOP, which are effective at reducing such losses, have become the key to winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis, Americans and the entire global audience. Efforts to retain public support in this regard should be maximized during war to effectively reduce the loss of life, reduce the length of foreign occupation and impact of military struggle on long term US strategic interests.

Works Cited:

1.Jefferies, John W. Wartime America: The World War II Home Front. Chicago, Illinois: Ivan R. Dee Inc. 1996

2.Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Trans. Ralph Sawyer. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Running Press Book Publishers. 1994.

3.Simpson, Christopher. Science of Coercion: Communication Research & Psychological Warfare 1945-1960. New York, New York. Oxford University Press. 1994.

4.US Department of Defense: Defense Science Board. The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations in Time of Military Conflict. Washington, DC. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 2000.

5.Thomas, Timothy L. New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare. Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 2000. http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/china/chinesepsyop.pdf

6.Thompson, Mark. “How To Squeeze a City” Time Magazine April 19, 2004: pg 43-50.

7.“MARCH against the occupation of war in Iraq” flash.net 10/19/05 .

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